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resumo
Social contract theory has been used to explain the origin, emergence and 
justification of governing authorities and as a way of “understanding the 
political relationships in which people already find themselves, including their 
obligation to obey the sovereign” (Newey, 2008, p. 133). It has also been used 
as a “nonliteral image [that is] useful in suggesting directions for social change” 
(Keeley, 1985, p. 241). Through the lens of social contract theory this article 
uncovers a series of questions that speak directly to music education in both the 
U.S. and Brazil. What is the nature of the relationship music educators have to 
authority? Is there a state of nature from which music education arose and could 
return? What, if any, guiding morals exist in this state of nature and how have 
those perpetuated and reproduced policy and advocacy? What kind of contract 
has been made and should it be kept?
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A teoria do contrato social tem encontrado uso quando se tenta explicar a 
origem, emergência e justificativa da autoridade governamental, bem como 
uma maneira de “entender as relações políticas dentro das quais pessoas já 
se encontram, incluindo suas obrigações de obedecer a uma soberania [ou 
soberano]” (Newey, 2008, p. 133). Ela também tem sido usada como uma 
“imagem não linear que pode ser útil em sugerir direções para mudanças 
sociais” (Keeley, 1985, p. 241). Através da lente da teoria do contrato social 
este artigo apresenta uma série de questões que falam diretamente à educação 
musical nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil. Qual é a relação que educadores 
musicais têm com autoridade? Pode-se afirmar a existência de um “estado 
natural” a partir do qual educação musical nasce e ao qual ela retorna? Qual, 
se existente, é a moralidade principal que guia este “estado natural” e de que 
maneira influencia e reproduz políticas e advocacia? Que contratos temos feito 
como profissão e quais devem ser mantidos?
PalavRaS-chavE: teoria política, estado natural, autoridade
abstract
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O Contrato Social e a Educação Musical: A Emergencia 
da Autoridade Politica
BENEDICT, Cathy
REVISTA DA ABEM  |  Londrina   |  v.20  |  n.27  |  11-20  |  jan.jun 201212
T hose are powerful words. Filled with apprehension and fear Hobbes warns us about the “other” as much as he warns us about ourselves. Yet, written over 350 years ago what meaning can music educators find within them? How can a theory or a device that was introduced (or 
at the very least articulated in print) 2400 years ago with Socrates and Crito, shed light on music 
education? What do issues such as mutually governed social and communal possibilities, vain 
self-esteem, mutual scorn, pride, competition and the condition of danger and continual fear have 
to do with music education? Unfortunately, a lot more than we wish they did.
First and foremost, social contract theory has been used to explain the origin and emergence 
of government (including associations, communities, societies, etc.) and the “derivation of [their] 
legitimacy” (Riley, 1973, p. 544). It has also been used as a “device which aims to identify the 
conditions in which a political authority would be justified” (Newey, 2008, p. 146) and as a way of 
“understanding the political relationships in which people already find themselves, including their 
obligation to obey the sovereign” (Newey, 2008, p. 133). Farrelly (2006, para. 5) also suggests 
that the purpose of political theory is to “diagnose practical predicaments and to show us how 
best to confront them”. In the case of music education, I see two very practical predicaments 
we continually confront. One is that of perceived epistemological inequalities with other ways of 
knowing in such disciplines as mathematics, the sciences and technology and language arts. The 
other is the relationship music educators have with music and arts governing authorities such as 
National Association of Music Education (NAfME)2  in the U.S., Associação Brasileira de Educação 
Musical (ABEM) in Brazil, the political structures that dictate National Curriculum in the UK, and 
other governing authorities as they are made manifest in national, state and local authorities 
throughout the world.
As a hypothetical abstract account, historical account, or both, the social contract remains a 
powerful device that we can use to diagnose and examine larger issues that often remain hidden. It 
also provides a way to think through how deeply contractual engagements reflect (and reproduce) 
capitalistic 21st century and the effect this has had on associations, societies, communities and 
organizations that are not based on contractual engagements, and how, through this lens, these 
organizations are no longer (and for the most part can no longer be) recognized as “legitimate” 
(Gauthier, 1977).
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every 
man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what 
their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them with all. In such condition, there 
is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture 
of the earth; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no 
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and 
which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Chapt. XIII, p. 183).1
We do well to be afraid of Hobbes; he knows too much about us. (Macpherson, 1945, p. 525)
1.  A note as to how I am referencing many of the texts used in this article. I am including the editions I use in the references 
– many of which can be found online – but when referencing passages of classic texts in the body of the article I am using 
the designation of part, chapter and paragraph number.
2.  NAfME was, until September 1, 2011, known as Music Educators National Conference, or MENC.  However, most all of 
the references in this article occur previous to this name change, thus the usage of MENC throughout the article.
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Social contract theory enables us to consider those ways political authority has been 
justified by music educators and our “disposition towards obedience and subordination” toward 
that authority (Wolin, 2004, p. 261). As such, in this article I address the conditions that exist (or 
existed) that justified (or might justify) the emergence of a governing authority and the imagined 
state of nature to which we would return without the protection of authority or sovereign. I also 
consider those ways the use of a social contract in music education has become justification and 
proof of our existence and consequently an obligation. In other words, I take into account social 
contract engagements to which we purposefully courted (as in the case of Brazil) and those we 
neither consented either in word or deed but whose existence has conditioned us to behave as if 
there is a contract. Moreover, this is a contract, I submit, that is not with a democratic citizenry, in 
which music education might play an integral part, but rather a governing authority whose interest 
lay in maintaining a status quo that is based on the protection of private property rather than 
communication and a commitment to broader cultural and community practices.
The following scenario serves to call our attention to the fine line between peaceful, pleasant, 
just and fair behavior, and those of desperation, conflict and combative engagements. It may not 
be the reality of every reader, but the story I am about to tell serves, in the grand tradition of political 
theorizing, as “fancy, exaggeration, even extravagance, [that may] permit us to see things that are 
not otherwise apparent” (Wolin, 2004, p. 18).
Imagine if you will, that we live in a time in which scarcity of resources elicits behaviors of 
competition. For many, it is not difficult to envision situations in which time for music in the school 
and curricular schedule seems always in flux or in question. Nor is it difficult to imagine that many 
of us are being held accountable to local, national and (especially) international mandates that call 
for the curriculum to include more technology, science and mathematics. Imagine also directives 
that are calling for the inclusion of music but with standards and assessment so tightly controlled 
that pedagogy is essentially dictated by an outside authority. The fear of budget constraints and 
shifting epistemological whims portends the continual demise of our livelihood. Even the simple 
valuing of our work is rare, and often in our minds, insufficient. We are in a continual state of 
protecting that which we have, and competing for what we believe we are due. Returning to a pre-
institutional time that preceded what we do have is so far beyond contemplation that we would 
do almost anything to maintain the status quo. It is this pre-institutionalized authority, or the State 
of Nature, however, on which I now focus in order to consider issues of private property and the 
historical conditions for competition, shame, envy, moral vigor and the emergence of authority.
Rousseau and Hobbes conceived the pre-authority/sovereign state as both abstract, 
hypothetical, conjecture and historical. And whether it has been referred to as “original position, 
by Rawls, or the initial bargaining position by Gauthier” (Cudd, 2008), as a thought experiment, or 
as an indictment of the historical claim for the “legitimacy of men’s power over women” (Pateman; 
Puwar, 2002, p. 123), this initial situation (and the situation to which we could return), is integral to 
the social contract and the emergence and justification of authority. In this paper I focus primarily 
on the work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, each of whom, in order to further multiple and 
sometimes disparate goals and ends, differ in their conception and use of social contract and, 
consequently, in their conception and use of the State of Nature.
The state of nature is most often described as either foreboding, antagonistic and aggressive, 
or welcoming and relatively communal. The above scenario I painted, in which there is a lack of 
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It is Locke to whom we turn first, however, for his belief that the foundation and need for authority 
should be based on the protection of property. Locke argued that men,3 as they lived together 
as equals, would want to join together willingly and “unite into a community for their comfortable, 
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties” (Chapt. 
VIII, 95).4 In this scenario, all men would be obligated to the majority and in doing so, would give 
up certain rights held in the state of nature “for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and 
estates, which I call by the general name, property” (Chapt. IX, 123). As Locke’s ultimate goal 
was the preservation of property the establishment of laws and consent to the establishment 
of authority made perfect sense, because as Locke pointed out, “no rational creature can be 
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse” (131). Locke helps us to see 
how giving up certain rights would benefit those who stand to gain; “rational” creatures, after all, 
include those who already have private property. As such, he also helps us to see that while the 
protection and maintenance of private property safeguards those who already have, it also keeps 
out those that do not.
Hobbes, as we read in the opening quote from Leviathan, believed that the state of nature 
was dire precisely because men were equal “in the faculties of body, and mind” (Chapt. XIII, p. 
183).5 As such, it was “reasonable… by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men… till he 
see no other power great enough to endanger him” (p. 184). In Hobbes’ state of nature equality 
begat envy, competition, and without a common power to “over-awe” (p. 185) there was to be 
found little reason in enjoying or socializing in the company of others, only grief, a constant state 
of war and “every man, against every man” (p. 186).
Rousseau (1754) provides a differing view of the state of nature that speaks of caring for 
rather than war or preemptive aggression. However, even in a welcoming state of nature men 
behave in ways that lead to inequality and unhappiness. Rousseau believed civil society provided 
too much leisure time and because of this men “acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and 
merit, which soon gave rise to feelings of preference” (Second Part). This, according to Rousseau, 
led not only to more wants, but also to the weakening of moral vigor.
What then the connection between private property, civil society and leisure time and music 
education? Hobbes’ version of the state of nature, one in which justice is considered to be 
preemptive aggression in order to protect one’s goal, helps us to consider the pre-institutionalized 
setting as one in which no one is secure in the pursuit of music education as a curricular goal. Locke 
provides a way to think through the emergence of authority and the protection of private property 
3.  The constraints and the focus of this article do not allow me to speak to the many feminist critiques of social contract 
theory.  While I use the word men throughout the article I do so in the context of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. For 
feminist critiques see (among many others) Pateman (1988), Hampton (1984), Hirschmann & McClure (2007), Rawls 
(1971), Mill (1859), and even Locke (1980).
4.  See Locke (1980).
5.  See Hobbes (1985).
Each one began to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a value came 
to be attached to public esteem. Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, 
the strongest, the most dexterous, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration; 
and this was the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice. From these 
first distinctions arose on the one side vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy: 
and the fermentation caused by these new leavens ended by producing combinations fatal to 
innocence and happiness. (Rousseau, 1754, Second Part).
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as a justification for and the protection of the cultural artifact of Western Classical music and 
its traditional pedagogical practices. To further the protection of the goal preemptive aggression 
could be read then as the need to dismiss, be disdainful of and deliberately misrecognize all 
musics and musicing practices that are not Western Classical. Or in other words, to incorporate a 
(perhaps not so) “fancy, exaggeration, even extravagance, [that may] permit us to see things that 
are not otherwise apparent” (Wolin, 2004, p. 18) we might imagine the following scenario:
In order for music to have a permanent place in public education music educators transfer 
their right to an authoritarian body. In doing so, music educators become obligated to this 
governing authority and give up the right to challenge, prevent or resist decisions that are made 
to protect and further the goals of the governing authority. These goals are simple and relentlessly 
focused: music in schools should be Western Classical music and in order to further this goal 
music programs should consist primarily of large ensembles.
This scenario is perhaps not so fanciful if we use Rousseau to substantiate the historical 
conditions and the advent and arrival of music from Europe, or the “serious, animated, and devout 
music” (Mark; Gary, 2007, p. 90) that served (and in many cases serves) to dismantle (and keep 
out of public schools) “non-traditional” musicing practices. And while the following historical 
conditions I note are particular to the U.S., Brazil is now poised in a similar place with similar 
concerns. As such the cautionary tale of post Revolutionary War America, while particular to the 
U.S., “may permit us to see things that are not otherwise apparent” (Wolin, 2004, p. 18).
Prior to the Revolutionary War, formalized singing resided primarily in singing schools that 
existed to “promote the singing of psalms” (as cited in Mark; Gary, 2007, p. 70). However, after the 
American Revolutionary war in the mid 1800’s, there was a wide spread belief that “Yankee singing 
schools” had become the “cause of the low estate of scientific music” (Mark; Gary, 2007, p. 90). 
Clearly, if there were ever a call for moral vigor, this was one that not only needed to be supervised 
but to be maintained. What began in the U.S. as a healthy existence of singing schools and 
informal musicing outside the formal process of schooling, morphed into a powerful movement to 
bring music into the public schools. As such, due to (among other issues) the Common School 
movement, the preservation of democracy and a call for the “education for all people” (Mark; 
Gary, 2007, p. 108), leaders in the singing schools and music societies came together in 1837 
and formed a committee to recommend public school music based on “three utilitarian reasons – 
intellectual, moral, and physical development” (Mark; Gary, 2007, p. 142). Note the following from 
their rationale as the grounds of music as a moral endeavor:
Consequently, this 1837 document and others like it, essentially created the first contract with 
the public proffering qualities that have governed our policies and behaviors till this day: utilitarian 
and moral.
Out of this 1837 movement eventually grew the Music Supervisors National Conference 
which eventually morphed into MENC. Shieh (2009) has pointed out that at the beginning of 
this governing authority there was a remarkable level of give and take between the governing 
board and the members of the organization (music educators). Because the purpose at that time 
was “a broadening of music curriculum”, MENC “functioned much like a kind of professional 
learning community, through which music educators were able to come together for peer-to-peer 
There is, – who has not felt it, – a mysterious connection, ordained undoubtedly for wise 
purposes, between certain sounds and the moral sentiments of man. … if there be this necessary 
concordance between certain sounds and certain trains of moral feeling…why should they not, 
under proper management, be rendered equally efficient in the moral government of the school? 
(Mark; Gary, 2007, p. 142).
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interaction and dialogue” (Shieh, 2009, p. 5, 6). Shieh (2009, p. 7) believes that throughout the 
period previous to the late 1990’s National Standards movement the agenda of MENC was “to 
break down the isolation separating music teachers and supervisors from each other, and bring 
them into interaction that might challenge the constraints of a narrow music culture”. While Shieh 
(2009, p. 4) speaks of MENC’s failure (among other issues) to build capacity, I suggest that as 
the cultural climate changed and moved even further into a market based economy, the agenda 
of MENC continued to be shaped by the cultural capital of Western Classical music and became 
beholden to perpetuating the dictates and advocacy needs of the National Standards and the 
accountability movement. Consequently, communication and curricular expansion, goals that had 
once been at the heart of the emergence of the need for authority, gave way to an agenda that, in 
Shieh’s (2009, p. 10) words “implicitly divided the organization into leadership and membership”.
Recall from the opening quote that Hobbes believed that in a state of war “there is no 
place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain”. When there is no security one cannot 
be industrious. However, a relationship with a sovereign that has more of an interest in the 
maintenance of private property curtails and makes challenging acts of industry that may move 
us beyond moral and utilitarian purposes. Clearly, when one finds one’s life in constant peril it 
is best to stick with curricular and pedagogical models that “work”; models that are measurable 
and dependable. And yet, many of these models facilitate and maintain a state of nature that 
furthers competition, greed, distrust, and vainglory.
Gauthier (1977) speaks of the political order and how other motivations have come to be 
used to maintain (even coerce) order and consent. He points to “patriotism—the love of country 
which binds men to the coercive order because it is surrounded with the emotional trappings of 
fatherland motherland” (Gauthier, 1977, p. 160) as the current and prolific motivation for peace 
in the U.S. In a society where news reports consist of black and white statements meant to elicit 
reactions of either/or, where it’s assumed that society will respond only to radical slogans and 
false syllogisms, a state of nature “where every man is enemy to every man,” Hobbes’ state of 
nature is more than alive and well. Indeed, Giroux (2009, p. 1) has recently labeled this a “culture 
of cruelty” in which a “seeping, sometimes galloping, authoritarianism [has begun] to reach into 
every vestige of the culture”.
Critchley (1999, p. 127) traces this patriotism/nationalism back to the nineteenth century and 
views it as a “civic religion that ensured social cohesion and patterns of national identification for 
the newly hegemonic middle classes, providing a model which could then be extended to the 
working classes, as and when they were allowed to enter the political process”.6 This is a model 
that has “served” music education well; as the working class margin of general education we are 
forever hopeful that we might enter the political process of inclusion. So much so that in the U.S. 
we seem to have created and lived by our own socially cohesive (false) syllogism:
state 
of war
6.  For an in-depth look at how musical experiences and repertoire as curriculum can create fascistic responses see D. 
Bradley (2009).
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a. All advocacy leading toward inclusion is good.
b. Some musical engagements (or ways of thinking about the purpose of music) don’t lend 
themselves toward inclusion.
c. Engagements that don’t further or maintain the status quo are bad.
Whatever “function we promise” or continue to promise, as Regelski (2009, personal 
communication, August 29) points out, “there can be no ‘contract’ with students or the public since 
supposed benefits cannot be verified and all teaching is ‘good’ or ‘good enough’”. Judgments 
about the quality of music education, or the value of an education in music, as determined by 
transcendent goods or utilitarian ends, has troubled and beleaguered institutional goals, teacher 
preparation programs, pedagogical and curricular choices, our very identity. So much so that I 
contend we have long ago become “[disposed] towards obedience and subordination (Wolin, 
2004, p. 261) and blind to any authority other than inclusion in the daily schedule.
When one comes to the point where struggles with identity and purpose become so 
overwhelming, absolutism through a sovereign starts to look pretty comfortable. Recall Hobbes’ 
three conditions that make for “quarrel,” competition, diffidence (distrust) and glory.
Surely we are able to recognize these qualities and behaviors in ourselves and acknowledge 
why we are intent on cultivating, and perhaps forever returning to, a “simpler and more reassuring 
map of power” (Butler, 1997, p. 78). Hobbes based his conception of the state of nature on the 
behaviors of his fellow men. Hardly an abstract conception, the social contract permeates every 
aspect and every engagement in ways that make us always already part of a community that 
contracts. Where we once considered contractual engagements as the cause of our behaviors, 
Gauthier (1977) suggests that these relationships are now the rationale for our behaviors, including 
those between ourselves, and those between communities and organizations. Consequently, 
the justification for allegiance to the sovereign has now shifted toward determining the measure 
of rationality based on contractual relationships. Gauthier warns us to show greater concern 
toward these contractual engagements or we will end up abandoning, disregarding, or worse 
appropriating those ways of engaging that are not contractually bound. For instance, musicing 
practices that are outside of the given norms and moral grounding of large ensembles, musicing 
and pedagogy that doesn’t lead toward ‘reading and writing” music, music appreciation and 
theory classes regulated by historical eras and ‘legitimate’ musics, can very well be seen as pre-
social and thus, disobedient and wrong.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for Reputations. 
The first use violence, to make themselves master of other mens person… the second, to 
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of 
undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends their nation, 
their profession, or their name. (Chapt. XIII, p. 185).
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In the U.S. generations of engagements and discourse that speak to myths, meritocracy, 
cause and effect, linear progression and the possibility of happy endings have supported and 
maintained a perceived need for a governing authority. Advocacy as persuasion, seen only as 
a way “to convince others that these doings warrant support and resources” (Bowman, 2009, p. 
3), has become so deeply engrained as a unifying structure of who and how we are that it often 
determines the “institutionalized values” (Illich, 1972, p. 2) of the formal process of schooling and 
also maintains the need for a governing authority. It is not that music teachers in the U.S. cannot 
imagine, or cannot remember engaging in musicing that is pre-institutional, but rather that few in 
the U.S. school music setting are from pre-institutional, pre-capitalist settings when “economic 
interests were subordinate” (Macpherson, 1945, p. 527). For the most part in the U.S. most musical 
experiences for music teachers were constructed by participation in bands, orchestras and choirs 
that were shaped by the “dominance of competitive material appetites” (Macpherson, 1945, p. 
527), a dominance that was alive and well for Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and their fellow citizens 
even in what was then a market based (bourgeois) society. In Brazil, however, musicing in pre-
institutional and pre-capitalist settings means something other than the organized pre-determined 
musicing shaped by Western classical music and practices. State mandates of public music 
education position music teachers in Brazil upon a precipice of justifying the authority of western 
practices or questioning, as Riley (1973, p. 544) wrote, the “derivation of [their] legitimacy”. Both 
situations differ and yet both present a state of nature to which neither group desires to return.
I am reminded that both Hobbes and Locke treated the state of nature as one that was 
both abstract and historical. A theoretical state of nature provided a way to conceptualize the 
emergence and justification for authority and yet these men could not separate out their daily 
and lived experiences from how they envisioned from whence we came and to where we might 
return. It really is not an either/or state of nature: simple, uncomplicated, peaceful, or solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short. It is some of these and all of these, always in flux and always in need 
of reflection and consideration. Unfortunately, what we can seem to count on is the continuance 
of draconian acts of legislation that perpetuate and reproduce transactional relations. To what 
end, then, and to whom are we obligated? Obligation and consent are tricky concepts; they are 
ones that speak to (among others) moral relations, reciprocity, language/actions, determinism, 
will, covenants and one’s conception of not only the state of nature, but of one’s self. Indeed, at 
this juncture in Brazil, conversations of obligation and consent suggest a commitment toward 
recognizing the challenge of situating music education in the formal structure of public schooling 
and honoring and upholding traditional musicing practices that are an essential part of Brazil’s 
multiple cultures.
Conversations such as these are overwhelming, but clearly they can and are happening. 
Unfortunately, it is often much easier to go with codifying music curricula and pedagogy in ways 
that provide navigable structure and measurable outcomes. And yet, what has “worked” should 
be considered an aggressive state of nature and even as an “initial bargaining position” to which 
a) we don’t want to return, and b) one that hasn’t really served as a bargaining position. It is not 
that we must dismantle governing authorities. Rather it is to remain dedicated to the emergence 
of authority as represented in the grass roots conversations that are happening in Brazil that 
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